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  1. Nintendo’s mass takedown of emulator code is misguided

    Emulators are what got me into Nintendo gaming as a child!

    When I was an unemployed 13-year-old I first played Nintendo 64 games on a PC emulator (UltraHLE). I have such fond memories of playing the original Legend of Zelda: Ocarina of Time on my Windows 98 desktop computer. It didn't work perfectly and was glitchy, but it was what I had and I loved it. Later, when I dropped out of college I splurged and bought myself a GameCube. Now I'm a 42-year-old tech bro and I just completed the Ocarina of Time Remake for Switch 2—on my Switch 2 console. Thanks to emulators, I grew up loving Nintendo games and now that I have the money to pay for them, I do.

    This got drowned out by all the NVIDIA craziness, but yesterday IGN reported that Nintendo mass-filed DMCA takedowns on open source emulator code hosted on GitHub. It’s stupid to keep seeing headlines like this. Emulation in and of itself is not software piracy. Nintendo keeps fighting to keep the code for Yuzu Emulator off the Internet, even though the code itself does not contain decryption keys that bypass Nintendo's software DRM. It does not illegally circumvent Nintendo's technological protection measures, and it does not violate Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.

    The DMCA allows intellectual property holders to strike down content from the Internet without ever getting a court order, and Nintendo is abusing it with gusto in their ongoing crusade against software emulation. Through repeated DMCA takedowns and fight-to-the-death lawsuits Nintendo’s actions create a chilling effect on research and open source software development in this space—but this is a seriously misguided strategy.

    Emulators themselves have commercial value and are used legitimately by software companies to port older games to newer platforms, such as Sonic’s Ultimate Genesis Collection for Xbox 360, or—ironically—Nintendo's own release of Wii games for Android in China. Nintendo’s lawsuits and harassment against the actual geniuses who research and come up with emulation software will only hurt them in the long run when they have to re-re-release Ocarina of Time for the 10,000th time on a new microarchitecture. And it might keep some people from ever discovering and falling in love with Nintendo games in the first place.

    Posted 2026-11-12 00:00:00 CST by henriquez. Comments
  2. Borderlands 4 Year 1 100% Review

    I played through all 189gb so you don’t have to.

    I want to start this game review off by saying I don't normally do game reviews, but seeing the Internet ablaze about this game for all the wrong reasons made it clear to me that I must set the record straight, because nobody (other than myself) is qualified to defend Borderlands 4 from the onslaught of hate speech and brainrot propagated by vile mouth-breathing incels on Reddit and YouTube.

    Furthermore, Gearbox CEO Randy Pitchford is a stunning and brave paragon of humanity who would be extolled only as a gaming Messiah, except for his tragic—yet brutally human—shortcoming of allegedly shitposting on cocaine all the time.

    Now, a Borderlands game wouldn't be properly released without a certain amount of controversy, and thankfully Randy stepped up in the immediate aftermath of the Borderlands 4 launch, when game reviewers and Day 1 players were concerned that the game had some (minor) “performance issues,” (which really doesn't give the whole picture of the development cycle of a AAA game of this significance [and should be weighed against factors such as developer and marketing timetables, NVIDIA driver releases, and preorder revenue targets.])

    Ever eager to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, Randy Pitchford stepped up with a retort to these minor performance concerns—that Borderlands 4 is a “premium game made for premium gamers”—essentially telling people to buy a bigger computer if they don't like how the game runs, a comment that would go down in infamy in this day and age of $800 DDR5 kits and $5000 consumer graphics cards. Randy's out-of-touch comment was the digital equivalent of rape. His tone-deaf sentiment landed about as well as Marie Antoinette's "Let them eat cake" debacle, and it set the stage for a historic gamer backlash of a magnitude not seen since Anita Sarkeesian started allowing women to play video games.

    So as usual, in order to review a Borderlands game, it becomes necessary to set aside the online behavior of Randy Pitchford and look at the game as a game. And in that respect Borderlands 4 certainly is at least a game. As with previous entries, Borderlands 4 takes place in an end-stage capitalist space dystopia where militaristic corporations control fleets of starships and private armies, hell-bent on stripping planets of their natural resources, all while developing bigger and crazier weapons to destroy their competition. The player takes on the role of a Vault Hunter—an unusually competent mass murderer who rejects the status quo of plundering for corporate gain in favor of a much more noble pursuit: plundering for personal gain.

    I wouldn't consider myself a Borderlands “super fan,” but I have played and enjoyed most of the games in the series, starting with Borderlands 1 on the XBOX 360, Borderlands 2 and DLC and Tales on XBOX One, and the Pre-Sequel in split-screen co-op. These were actually some of my favorite games of all time, so maybe I was a Borderlands super fan. At least until Borderlands 3 came out.

    I tried so hard and got so far, but in the end I retired Borderlands 3 to my backlog after numerous failed starts with the game. Between horribly unoptimized launch performance—a recurring theme, try-hard humor and obnoxious characters, the whole thing fell flat for me and many others. (It wasn't until years later that I came to appreciate it as an actual masterpiece—more on that soon!)

    Borderlands 4 takes place on a new planet called Kairos with a new set of deranged vault hunters and it examines the philosophical question of what happens when Borderlands 3’s story was so widely hated that it literally crashed and burned into an entire planet, setting off a race against the end of time—a race that only an absurd arsenal of firepower, loads of loot, and bizarre friends (both new and old) could see through to the end. It's a game that Gearbox has acknowledged was created to right the narrative wrongs of Borderlands 3.

    But does it succeed? My answer is sort of.

    Read More

    Posted 2026-11-10 00:00:00 CST by henriquez. Comments
  3. Response to Nicomachean Ethics

    In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle ponders what makes for a “good” life. He considers a hierarchical view of what is good based on the ends of a particular action being used to affect more important actions with more important ends. For example, a blacksmith builds a sword for a soldier. Certainly, Aristotle would say, the sword itself is more important than the act of crafting it, for the process of crafting was taken for the sole purpose of creating the sword. Then, the soldier who uses the sword to achieve victory for the country in battle would fall under a similar discussion: the victory is more “good” than the battle.

    But, the ends of these actions were only worth pursuing for the sake of something else. Is there any end worth pursuing for its own sake and never for the sake of something else? Aristotle proposes that happiness is the most “complete” end to all of our other pursuits.

    He then argues that happiness comes from action in accordance with virtue, but this confounds his previous definition of happiness as an end in and of itself. Consider the example of a virtuous man who believes so strongly in his principles that he is willing to stand up against an unjust government and be killed for promoting his beliefs. Suppose he becomes a martyr, and his death is instrumental in turning the hearts and minds of citizens and overthrowing the unjust government. He may derive pleasure from acting virtuously, but he does not achieve happiness, because he his killed.

    This contradicts Aristotle’s assertion that happiness itself is the most important end to any hierarchy of actions and outcomes. Rather, I claim that happiness is irrelevant to whether a life is good.

    Consider, again, the same man as above. Suppose he is severely depressed and addicted to drugs and alcohol. Despite his vices he is a virtuous man of action, and as Aristotle notes, he derives pleasure from acting in accordance with his virtues. But any happiness that comes from this pleasure is overshadowed by depression, despair and anger. Could we say that he lived a good life?

    I say yes. If the bad of the man’s vices is overshadowed by the greater good of his political activism, and if the disruption of trying to break his addiction and depression would prevent him from achieving his goals, then he could live a good life by acting virtuously, in spite of his flaws and never experiencing happiness. This man is a sad puppet of his own virtues with nothing else to live for, but his actions are good in the same way that the blacksmith’s process of crafting is good, or the soldier battling to protect the country is good.

    Living a good life can involve sacrificing one’s self, and so happiness is irrelevant to living a good life. Rather, acting virtuously, according to a set of principles, and working to improve society as a whole, potentially in spite of one’s self-interests, are factors that comprise a good life. The good in improving the world outweighs the good an individual may experience personally in our judgment of his life. Otherwise we would have to say that it is good to act purely out of self-interest and in pursuit of the most basic of pleasures.

    Posted 2025-12-13 01:25:26 CST by henriquez. Comments
  4. Moral Judgment is Irrational

    Thomas Nagel poses a paradox in his essay titled Moral Luck: how can we assign a moral judgment to a person for a particular action when significant causes and effects of the action are determined by factors outside of that person’s control? In this essay, I will draw parallels between Nagel’s paradox and David Hume’s problem of induction to conclude that there is no rational basis for our concept of moral responsibility. I will conclude by briefly proposing an alternative to our criminal justice system based on utilitarian principles.

    A person’s intentions in taking action may not be congruent with the outcome of that action, but we nevertheless judge the agent based on the outcome. Nagel gives the example of a reckless driver on a joyride, speeding through a stop sign: on a typical day he might be pulled over and receive a slap on the wrist by law enforcement. But supposing he were to strike and kill a little girl in the intersection, he would be charged with manslaughter. The presence of a little girl is entirely out of the driver’s control, yet he is judged more harshly for killing her negligently. Similarly, if a would-be murderer’s bullet misses his mark, he is charged with attempted murder and sentenced less harshly than had he been successful.

    Nagel uses the term “moral luck” to describe the role of factors outside of a person’s control influencing the outcomes of his action in the context of us rendering a moral judgment of the person for his action. We don’t limit our judgment of a person’s action only to factors that are under a person’s control: stringently applying this criterion would allow us to find and exclude more and more factors that are out of the person’s control, completely eroding our ability to assign responsibility and render judgment. Rather, we hold a person responsible not only for his own volition, but for the outcomes bound to his action entirely by chance.

    How can we justify this method of rendering a judgment? The condition of control that we gravitate towards in examining the concept of responsibility leads to a paradox where a person both is and isn’t in control of what he does. Nagel admits that he doesn’t have a solution to this problem.

    There is an intuitively pragmatic justification for rendering judgments based on moral luck. We do so for society to function. We rely upon moral luck when we condemn a criminal for his misdeeds or praise a scholar for his scientific theory. No one is bothered that the scholar couldn’t have arrived at his theory without using the results of others—factors outside of his control—when we award him the Nobel Prize. In the interest of maintaining social order, moral luck is intuitively relevant.

    But philosophically, the concept of moral luck has questionable justification, as Nagel’s paradox demonstrates. This paradox arises from the hypothesis that we can coherently assign moral judgment to a person, which is in fact irrational. To see this, it is instructive to consider David Hume’s problem of induction, posed in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.

    Hume’s problem breaks down to a question about the basis of knowledge: how can we justify the inductive process through which we form our beliefs about the unobserved when this process is based upon the potentially faulty hypothesis that past experiences are representative of future outcomes?

    As Hume skillfully argues, we can’t justify inductive reasoning rationally. Rather than by reason, our belief in inferential logic is a function of some other intrinsic principle of the mind “of equal weight and authority.” Hume calls this principle “custom or habit.” But the problem remains: if the principle of induction is not based upon reason, then any conclusions drawn from it are irrational.

    A similar problem plagues the study of moral responsibility when we examine the reasoning behind the hypothesis that we can coherently render moral judgments of a person. If this hypothesis cannot be justified rationally, then neither can any conclusions drawn upon it. Since its supposition can lead us to a paradox, it must be viewed suspiciously.

    Throughout his essay, Nagel uses the words “intuitive,” “plausible,” and “natural” to refer to the proposition that we can judge a person insofar as his actions were within his control. This is a narrower form of the broader proposition that we can judge a person whatsoever. Given how crucial this broader proposition is to the relevance of his argument, it would be worthy of at least some discussion, but Nagel offers none.

    Nagel is not alone in this lack of reasoning. Another leading philosophical theory addressing the problem of free will and moral responsibility is “the principle of alternate possibilities.” This holds that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. This argument succumbs to the same paradox that Nagel proposes through recursive application of the condition of control, and it is based upon the same chief assumption. Given the hypothesis that it is coherent to judge a person, the principle of alternate possibilities explains how we arrive at that judgment.

    But what reason do we have to take this hypothesis as given? “Intuitive,” “plausible” and “natural” are words that could just as well be used to justify inductive statements. Hume has proven the problems associated with such an approach. Certainly, the hypothesis is not axiomatic, or true a priori. Then, as W.C. Salmon points out in The Problem of Induction, “the hypothesis must be treated as a conclusion to be supported by evidence, not as a premise lending support to other conclusions.”

    Let us examine the problems that arise when we deconstruct the conclusion that it is coherent to morally judge a person. We begin by presupposing that it is coherent to morally judge an action, and eschew any thinking that “good” is subjective. This line of thinking is consistent with well-established philosophies on morality. For example: a criminal successfully robs $10,000 from a bank. We agree that his action was bad from the perspective that we can render moral judgments, namely the perspective of what is good for society. The perspective of what is good for the criminal’s personal wealth is irrelevant to our purposes.

    Now, provisionally assuming that we can morally judge a person, we further presuppose that in order to do so, we must base our judgment upon one or more of that person’s actions. As Aristotle pointed out, a man’s innate virtues and character, or lack thereof, are morally meaningless without action: a man who does not act cannot be congratulated or criticized. Again, this is in line with contemporary philosophy.

    Next we consider what is meant when we say we blame a man for his actions. I claim that this is an ampliative statement, i.e., non-truth-preserving. If we assume the contrary, that is, that in blaming a man we say nothing about the man or his character other than that his actions were bad, we contradict our purpose in considering the matter in the first place. For, our aim in reaching a judgment about the man himself is clearly greater than to say his actions were bad—the study of the philosophy of moral responsibility would have no purpose if all it aimed to say is that actions can be good or bad, or that they can be summed up. Rather, in moral judgment, we try to reach a greater truth about the man: that some kernel of free-will, perhaps his soul, guides his actions and is worthy of blame above and beyond his actions. Thus the hypothesis that it is coherent to judge a man from his actions is ampliative.

    Hume has proven that an inductive hypothesis has no rational basis, and Salmon extended this argument to include ampliative statements in general. Any effort to reach rational conclusions on top of such a hypothesis is misguided, as Nagel’s paradox demonstrates soundly. Salmon points out that “whether people have confidence in the correctness of a certain type of inference has nothing to do with whether such confidence is justified.” It may be a part of our human nature to believe with complete conviction that we are justified in judging others, but it is fallacious to assume such a justification is rational.

    Thus I conclude that our existing philosophies of moral responsibility are flawed, as they are based upon a hypothesis that has no rational justification. To legitimize moral judgment is to legitimize prejudice of an individual for actions he hasn’t committed yet. While this prejudice may be the outcome of a deeply-rooted habit of conviction, it is no more worthy of celebration than other prejudices such as racism and sexism.

    My conclusion is not strictly philosophical in nature. It could be applied to reformulate our criminal justice system upon utilitarian ethical principles. Our existing practice of moral judgment condemns criminals, not just for their actions, but for their very existence. This makes it more difficult for them to redeem themselves than it would be if they could simply amend their actions. Even when convicts are released from prison, they are often stigmatized, losing access to job opportunities, social welfare programs and civic responsibilities that would otherwise help them improve themselves. This only draws them back toward the criminal lifestyle.

    Clearly, society has a utilitarian interest in keeping dangerous criminals off the street. But I propose that the goal of incarceration should be rehabilitation and not moral justice. As it exists, and despite any lip-service to the contrary, the prison system is a commercial industry with no financial interest in rehabilitating convicts. Rather than just locking convicts away, the system should actively cultivate the positive aspects of their characters while attempting to address the negative characteristics that led them astray. Those convicts that could be successfully rehabilitated would, upon release, regain all the privileges of an ordinary citizen and allowed to reintegrate with society, maximizing the general happiness.

    Posted 2025-12-13 01:38:50 CST by henriquez. Comments
  5. We are past the point of no return for model collapse

    Dead Internet Theory has been around much longer than commerically-available Large Language Models. It's a conspiracy theory based on the premise that the Internet itself is basically fake and gay—all content on all web sites is generated by bots in order to command and mind control us like sheep or cattle. Even though I love me some edgelord bullshit, I never thought this was very plausible; the Internet is bigger than centralized social media websites, and prior to the explosion of LLMs, mass hypnosis by AI-generated content never seemed to me like it would scale well. But my, how times have changed.

    Recently, practically everything on every website has the hallmark indicators of AI generation. Social media sites like Reddit have devolved into a battle royale between ragebait and karma-farming prompts. Non-social media sites, too, have become obvious LLM content dumps. These AI garbage sites are referencing, summarizing, and feeding back into each other, and his is actually a huge problem for proponents of generative AI.

    AI companies will sell you the lie that their language models will revolutionize everything—after all, they are trained on the collective works of humanity! Well that's great, up until 2021. After that, the pool of possible training data (aka the Internet) has become so polluted with the AI-generated garbage that it's technically impossible to programmatically exclude all the AI slop from the training set. The problem is that when you train an AI model by feeding its own output back into it, the model degrades rapidly.

    Again, two-bit Silicon Valley hucksters will hand-wave around this problem. They'll buy off entire university research departments. They'll invest in GPU companies, who will reinvest in their same dumb AI companies, who then reinvest in GPU companies in an endless circlejerk. But the collapse of the model is a mathematical inevitability. You can hire an army of so-called data scientists and light billions of dollars of investor capital on fire, but you cannot stop an inevitability. Meanwhile, the Internet will keep breathing.

    Posted 2025-12-09 20:21:22 CST by henriquez. Comments